Conversations with Wohlforth - 5

Marxist Bulletin No. 3 (Part IV - 1965)

SPARTACIST-ACFI UNITY NEGOTIATIONS

Fifth Session 30 July 1965

Present: Spartacist: Robertson, Soute, Nelson (alt.), Harper, Secretary
ICFI: Wohlforth, Mazelis, Michael(alt.)

Meeting convened at 8:22 p.m. Chairman: Nelson

Agenda:

1. Minutes
2. Democratic Centralism
3. N.Y.C. Mass Election Leaflet
4. Epton Campaign Work
5. Discussion on SWP
6. IC correspondence
7. Time and Agenda of Next Meetings


1. Minutes:

Minutes of July 9 were approved as corrected (corrections incorporated).


2. Discussion on Democratic Centralism:

Robertson: The burden is on us to show how we think a group of our size ought to function, since in the event of unity the comrades from the Spartacist would initially be the majority. You have received our bulletin on the Smith case. Other documents explaining our position are "For the Right of Organized Tendencies to Exist Within the Party" and "Rescind the Suspensions:" We approach the question from the point of view of factional democracy. I was disturbed by comrade Wohlforth's remark last week that PL, the SWP, and Spartacist all claim to be democratic centralist organizations. But PL and the SWP seek to ban factions, while Spartacist defends the right of principled factions if properly regulated. Regulation is necessary to direct factionalism toward its legitimate end – arrival at a political line. The SWP used its regulatory powers for the purpose of suppressing the internal life of the party and reducing it to a mere safety valve every two years. There is also the question of the kind of balance that should be struck between the democratic and centralistic aspects. Daring the whole period of the American Trotskyist movement, the range of conditions under which Trotskyists have struggled has not been sufficiently great to justify any shift from the previous balance, i.e., the American party has never been either a mass party nor an illegal party; it has always been a propaganda group. In comparison with the total range in which democratic centralism was projected by the Bolsheviks to operate, we have experienced only a narrow range. We are a small propaganda group operating under conditions of legality. We don't deprecate the organizational question. It is one of the programmatic points defining a Trotskyist-Leninist organization, and the way an organization functions carries strong inferences about the role of that organization as a working class and revolutionary movement. The Russian movement split in 1903 over what was basically an organizational question: whether the majority will rule, what membership means. It would have been wrong for Lenin to have said these were "only organizational questions." While it would have been better to have had a clean, clear split (e.g., over an issue such as whether or not to have a bloc with Liberalism), nevertheless the issue was raised in this way, and it was important. Finally, if we try for a crystal clarity on organizational questions in these negotiating meetings, what the rights and obligations of membership are, there will be less grounds for anyone claiming to be "surprised" later.

Wohlforth: We don't see how we can comment on the case of Smith since in our opinion it's a messy business. In order to make a fair judgment one would have to have gone through this particular experience and know the person involved. It is difficult for us to come to any kind of conclusion about the extent of our agreement or disagreement since we don't have a Constitution or similar document in front of us. On what I said last week, I meant that merely saying that we are democratic centralist is not enough to indicate basic agreement in practice. The SWP, PL, Spartacist, and ACFI too, all claim to be democratic centralist. In the SWP content violates form, while PL lacks even the form. The SWP has a resolution before the coming Convention banning permanent factions, a departure from their previous formal position. On the content of democratic centralism in the history of the SWP, we may have a difference, for we don't look back on the SWP as a model on either organizational or political questions. Cannon was always an unprincipled factionalist, and Trotsky intervened against him. In Trotsky's opinion, Cannon was a Zinovievist. Trotsky was unhappy with the way in which Cannon handled the Shachtman struggle, and only a few days before his death he threatened to break with Cannon. Cannon always felt a common front of the leadership against the ranks had to be maintained, and this helped lead to the destruction of the central cadre. The artificial separation of the ranks from the leadership leads to clique relationships. (This of course does not mean certain types of problems, like personal problems, should not be taken up first by the leadership.) Organizational questions cannot be raised apart from programmatic or political questions. We should not take the 1903 experience as a model, because Lenin's own development was not complete at the time. Had he been what he was in 1917, it would have been different, not that he was wrong in 1903. This was the birth, not the full development, of the Bolsheviks, and we should not seek to repeat the whole history of the Bolsheviks in 1965. Trotsky always insisted on methodological struggle. We have no differences over formal formulations -- disciplined cadres, assignment to tasks, moving around, etc., but at the same time, in dealing with someone incapable of this type of functioning but who still maintains political agreement we should seek sympathizer status. We're not saying you were wrong on Smith, but we are certainly not saying this was a model. I'd like to see your Constitution when you get it worked out. We feel a certain attitude around Spartacist, a formalism on the organization question, a rigidity.

Nelson: There are two weaknesses in your statement on democratic centralism. First, your not knowing what our position really is without a Constitution. We are not brand new, and our attitude on democratic centralism is not at all new. Part of our thinking on this subject was involved in our choice of the two articles in our pamphlet, i.e., "Building the Bolshevik Party" and "What is Revolutionary Leadership?". Second, in part on the historical basis of the organizational question and the basis of this alone that we could come to agreement or disagreement. There is a relationship between the task of the vanguard party and its organizational forms. What you said last week about the SWP, PL, and Spartacist all claiming to be democratic centralist -- this is an agnostic position. You know we are not the same. You know our background, our stated positions, etc. Your weakness is that despite statements to the contrary you disconnect the political basis of organizational attitudes much too much. Your attitude toward Cannon is purely subjective, that Cannon is no more than an organizational front man for Trotsky, nothing more than an organizational judo expert, or in the words of Marcus just "a window breaker." In your own words, Cannon becomes Foster. Shows a weakness in your understanding of the role of the organizational question in the building of a revolutionary party. Cannon's tactics toward the Progressive Party are still considered a model. Individuals and groupings in the SWP complained that their intellectual capacities were being squashed by the bureaucratic Cannon. Trotsky didn't dismiss the question but saw that it was a smokesscreen for fundamental political differences. Trotsky insisted on discipline in building the F.I. The Smith case is a concrete example of the way we operate and how we view the obligations of members. It is not messy, as you claim, but clear-out. He committed a breach of discipline, and when he attempted to defend and justify it we brought charges; however, his final expulsion was not for the original breach but for his public attack on Spartacist. The Slaughter article, in the section "Lenin and Inter Party Struggle", does a nice job in condensing a formal statement on the role of the organizational question in the revolutionary party:

"Political and organizational questions therefore cannot be separated. In an epoch where the constructuon of a leadership of the working class is the most vital historical problem, it is exactly on the questions of concrete planning and discipline for revolutionary work that political differences become explicit. Some Marxists seem to conceive of the party as simply a contractual discipline to stop individuals from going off the rails as they react to class pressure. But it is more than that: it must become the vanguard of revolutionary action, the representative of the general interest of the working class.

"In the construction of a revolutionary party there is a constant need to strive to maintain a correct relationship between democracy and centralism. The balance of this relationship tends to change with the objective situation. During times when the revolutionary movement operates under legal conditions, as in Britain today, it is essential to have full democratic discussion on all questions concerning the working class and the party. This does not, however, mean that democracy is a free-for-all, with nothing being decided. To the Marxist democracy is a weapon in the struggle against capitalism. Discussion is necessary to arrive at decisions upon which the activity of the party can be based.

"The constant training of new leaders in the revolutionary party requires the greatest patience by the leadership. Local autonomy and initiative, allowing the leaders and the rank and file to learn from their mistakes, is essential for the branches of the revolutionary party. The more experience the revolutionary leadership has the more flexible it will be in assisting the ranks by theory and practice to understand the need for a democratic centralist party."

The main point of this is that democratic centralism is the form of the revolutionary party, and this form flows from its political tasks. Balance varies according to the objective situation. The general balance between democratic and centralist haven't changed that much in the history of the SWP. The British comrades during their early struggles didn't seem to be as horrified as much as you are in hindsight about Cannon. Healy in reply to our protest over our exclusion from the old minority tendency quoted as a model for the minority to follow the relationship of the SLL to Cannon and the SWP. You shouldn't try to read the Cannon of 1962 back into his earlier history. He maintained a revolutionary party in this country admirably under adverse conditions, and maintained it longer and better than any other national section. The SWP and YSA Constitutions are examples of our attitude toward democratic centralism.

Mazelis: You seem to want a vote of confidence on the question of Smith, and this would not be proper. The Smith case must be judged from an overall political standpoint. We need not only examples of Spartacist functioning but also a Constitution to discuss or a resolution. We feel there were serious differences between Cannon and Trotsky on the organizational question, and we agree with Trotsky. We are threshing out this question in the absence of written material, and while we can get somewhere we cannot get all the way. You misunderstand our position on Cannonism and the SWP, take it out of context when you refer only to "window breaking" or "Foster". This doesn't mean we equate Cannon with Foster or Debs, but it doesn't mean we view Cannon as a Marxist or Communist politician either. Our history project document deals with this in detail.

Stoute: We stand in the tradition of the SWP -- the old SWP stands for something we can say we are in agreement with now, that we can apply to our movement today. This of course doesn't mean we endorse everything Cannon ever did. Your attitude is that we must either wipe out everything the SWP has been or must embrace it totally. This is not the way it is. I would like Wohlforth to elaborate on his statement that Spartacist is a rigid, military, formation.

Robertson: Nelson made a valuable point that examples of our application of democratic centralism are of far more value than our Constitution for your information, since our Constitution will be absolutely standard. There is something that has not been taken up. "For the Right of Minority Tendencies to Exist" discussed at length and concretely the question Wohlforth said would be of greatest interest to him: relationship of a minority to the organization as a whole. We will have a Constitution, but you won't learn as much from it as you can from the material before you, and it is in that sense we introduced it. We don't care whether you think we are right or wrong, but want to show you how we proceed, the concrete application of a certain type of discipline. If you feel we are formalist, I will say we are an organization with several currents in it; this stems from your presently being small enough to have complete homogeneity -- therefore democratic centralism seems like sheer formalism to you. You should be thankful we are formalists. The SWP has learned to dispense with these formalities. Since we are a larger organization we must bring less personal and more impersonal forms into play. We have an internal life and this must be regulated. You are loading a lot on Cannon's shoulders. Shachtman always said Cannon was a Zinovievist, but where did Trotsky say this? To reduce the experiences of the SWP from 1928 to 1940 to Cannon is overstressing the central figure. You want to see documents? We have taken over the experiences and practices of the earlier Trotskyist movement. We use "Struggle for a Proletarian Party" to train our new members with (in it, by the way, Cannon says "pay attention to what I say here, not to anything I may have done"). It is not automatic by any means that we have as yet gone beyond the SWP. On the role of leadership, the leadership is elected to handle the infinity of day to day problems, reserving for the entire organization decision on fundamental differences. Cliquism was certainly rife in the SWP. One thing we have strived to do is shatter preferential access to information. Our comrades are heavily informed and this creates a much healthier organization.

Wohlforth: We have refracted differences on this question, derived from other differences, such as on the SWP, and our general approach to building a movement. I now agree with Robertson -- having a constitution here wouldn't prove anything. I am sure we would find any constitution you presented acceptable. The difference is in approach to politics and building a movement. On ACFI being a homogeneous group, we strive to create a homogeneous group (though we are opposed to monolithism). The way you strive to have a homogeneous group is the way you have democratic centralism. Discipline flaws from political cohesion. Any disciplinary problem is in essence a political problem, including the 1903 split. Cannon sought to create organizational, not political, homogeneity. We don't disagree with what Cannon says in his book but with the experience of the Cannon regime. However, Cannon wrote his own history. Trotsky intervened in the 1932 Cannon-Shachtman fight and used the term "Zinovievist" regarding Cannon. Trotsky intervened in the Field question and in 1940, urging political rather than organizational fight. Our difference on this question is similar to our differences on method, theory, and program. Our feeling is that you are formalistic about organizational questions. This will find greater reflection when we discuss tactical questions relating to our work in this country.

Nelson: I see that "method" has raised its saintly head (it always does), unscathed and pure. I am listening to the words. You have profoundly oversimplified Cannon's role. As far as seeking to create homogeneous groups through organizational means, such a thing is not even possible. However, the main point I want to make is to question the "purity" (pardon a certain sarcasm) of your intentions. I dislike hearing pious words when dirty actions have preceded. Back to the "bookkeeping". You express a desire for avoiding "organizational excesses"...yet you played a key role in the organizational excesses of the SWP and YSA against us. Your words fall on slightly calloused ears. I happened to go through this (comrade Michael didn't--it might be good for him to hear this). You became the "theoretical arm" of the party in their desire to get rid of us. It was your document "Party and Class" that provided the Majority with the basis for our expulsion. This was not just naivete on your part. Then in 1964 in the YSA I and the comrades of our tendency were fighting the frame-up suspensions. We defended ourselves not primarily on technical grounds, but brought out the political reasons and context of the suspensions, the question of Party-Youth relations, etc. Comrade Mazelis played a despicable role that night. The Majority was unable to deal with our arguments and with the damaging evidence against them. Mazelis, as the most capable person in the room, took the floor as lawyer for the Majority, stating that with our line on Cuba we could not function as disciplined YSA members. When we tried to lean on the Constitutional technicality that YSA members can belong to any adult political organization, Mazelis claimed that the YSA in fighting us was fighting Menshevism in the YSA (I have the notes right here I took that night). This was your role in facilitating our expulsions from the SWP and YSA. You were able to do a better job than Jack Barnes, Peter Camejo, or Barry Sheppard were able to because they didn't have,your background and understanding. This is your past again. These past actions do not coincide with your words tonight.

Michael: I didn't live through all this. This is the second week you've brought up these old questions, and I don't see why you are doing this. I don't think this will help. You can put all this in a bulletin and I'll read it, but what are our tasks today? I am interested in what our differences are today. If we discuss this first, we can then have a clearer discussion on these old questions. I can't see that this sort of discussion helps us.

Mazelis: I agree strongly with Michael. I don't intend to take up the gauntlet. I do feel we made mistakes- but not the ones Nelson stated. This is the wrong way to discuss democratic centralism and the wrong way to go about the whole process of unification. Not because we are ashamed but these questions can only be clarified in light of our positions today. Nelson has given us a sarcastic and subjective outpouring of the way he feels his tendency was wronged by us. We have a completely different viewpoint. Later at the proper time we will sum up all these questions. It will be part of a summing up and not this kind of abstract bookkeeping, as he himself refers to it. I don't feel under any obligations to take up these points just because they have been raised here tonight. They will be taken up later, but in the right way. We want to relate them to developments up to the present.

Stoute: You said we seem to have a disagreement on whether or not a revolutionary movement should be made homogeneous on the basis of politics or organizational rules. We don't propose to bring about homogeneity on the basis of org. rules. However, one never has complete homogeneity and this is why we have org. forms. You said we can't settle this question tonight. How will we settle this question? You know what we are made of. You have a better knowledge than anyone else where we stand on all these questions.

Robertson: You may not like what Nelson said, but these things are vivid in the minds of our comrades. This is your past as well as ours. This is the single obstacle in our minds; repetition of this extremely bad conduct must be avoided. Wohlforth is standing the question of political homogeneity on its head. One struggles for political homogeneity not because it gives real democratic centralism bit because then you don't need recourse to the organizational rules. I deplore factions if by argument you can prevent their formation in advance. Most political leaders spend much of their energy on internal struggle. But whenever organizations meet new situations, differences develop. Wohlforth made a mistake - we are most interested in political homogeneity; but when you don’t have it you must function by rules. My reference to Comrade Cannon's "Struggle for a Proletarian Party" was answered by Wohlforth's counterposing Theory and Practice. But words are part of practice and can't be separated out. You have found comrade Cannon to be the source of the ills of the strongest national section of the Trotskyist movement bar none. Many Spartacists would call themselves Cannonites. We look upon the earlier period of the Trotskyist movement in America as our heritage, to be accepted, critically.

Wohlforth: On the question of past differences between our groups, we have not objected to their discussion and feel this is an important part of the unification process and have discussed them ourselves in our communications. However, we feel that at this and the last meeting such discussion has been broadened artifically. We didn't get much clarity at the last meeting, and tonight is another example. You feel that in order for us to understand what you mean by democratic centralism you have to discuss what Mazelis said on a particular night. Maybe Nelson was saying Mazelis knows what democratic centralism is because he correctly attacked you for Menshevism in the YSA. But I had a feeling Nelson was saying something else --"that whatever Mazelis says now doesn't make any difference because he finked". If you want to discuss this, you can put "finking" on the agenda. This has been brought in artifically and has not led to clarity. We must try to view this discussion process as aimed at its goal. It would seem proper to first probe the level of agreement and disagreement today. We can then make judgements on the past if one of us wants to keep a record. Our conclusion is that the split in 1962 was principled; you think it was unprincipled. We should put this on the agenda so that it can be discussed in a positive manner and not poison all our discussions. To the extent that we presently have differences on democratic centralism, these are not sufficient to bar unity. Since Spartacist feels such an identity with Cannon, I am worried as to whether or not Spartacist comrades proceed first from political to organizational questions or vice versa. Your failure to understand the real role of Cannon will lead you in one way or another to make errors on the organizational question. We have a feeling you may have made an error (on the Smith case), but we don't know enough. We might have a sharp difference with the way you handled the case. However, whatever differences we have on this question would be subordinate to differences on all other questions. We have a difference in emphasis on the org. question, but this is subordinate to the political questions. We should hold up on discussion till we see what is the level of current agreement. In that framework we can have a real discussion on past differences. Human beings have a correct desire to justify themselves. We will do our best not to discuss these differences now, as we were tempted to do at the last meeting.

Nelson: Politics determine – that is why we are here. The friction that exists between us is that our two groups are very similar politically yet continue to remain organizationally separate and competing. Continuing this separation on the basis that we have to examine further and still further the basis for unity is in the course of time becoming quite thin to anyone with eyes to see. It is not artifical to bring in "old" questions. We went through a common experience in the same party. Your role towards us in the YSA was not one of exposing Menshevism. Our record and our documents show the struggle of a Bolshevik minority to maintain itself in the face of bureaucratic suppression. Unfortunately for you, this can't be pushed under the rug. Because of your past role, we have to get understanding of what proper minority rights are. We have the scars to show your past attitude. Now the wheel has turned. The minority split originally was over whether or not you and your supporters were willing to accept a minority position in our common tendency. You denied our tendency had the right to democratic centralist organization. One instance of this was when our tendency selected a representative to go on the YSA local exec. You refused to support our candidate, running your own instead and letting the majority choose the weaker one. This was unprincipled. The differences we had could have been maintained within a common tendency. The question of discipline was the origin of our split. In your "history project" you analyzed Cannon's history, but when it comes to your own history then suddenly you aren't interested. You can't separate what we are now from where we came from.

Mazelis: We don't want to discuss it now, not because we are not interested but because it is a question of haw you deal with it and the framework in which it is raised. We will deal with it in the proper way. Your subjective interpretation can't lead us anywhere. The incident you mention has a certain importance, but you are exaggerating it. We did not vote for the representative not because we didn't accept democratic centralism but because of the situation. A trip to England by Philips was being made at the time. During a crisis in the organization we felt it was wrong for you to wield your majority as you did. Your way of interpreting these matters is not our way. Since this incident preceded our split by two weeks, we simply didn't wish to be bound by any decisions.

Wohlforth: I think we can show what we mean by the relation of organization to politics and why we feel it is necessary to discuss the split in the tendency as a separate point. We and the British came to a common judgment at the time of our split . We had no intention of carrying out your line. If we felt differences today were of the same depth we would not be interested in unity. We have no intention of playing games. We want to find out before we unite whether or not there is enough political agreement that we can maintain your line. A split is forced upon people when they can't carry out the line of the majority. We are not putting forward the position that our differences in 1962 were not important. We will have unity if there is enough political agreement that either side could abide by the majority. We should be discussing now only our present attitude toward the organizational question.

Stoute: The 1962 split was unprincipled and shouldn't have taken place. It was unjustified politically and was basically around organizational difference:; How you reacted organizationally at the time is where our disagreements came in. Do you think the concept of democratic centralism that we sought to put into practice in 1962 was wrong? What kind of minority rights would you expect?

Robertson: Your position on the 1962 split is now a serious political difference between us. You had a cavalier attitude toward democratic centralism within our tendency. You supported the SWP hatchet job on us on the basis that organizational questions are not important. You acted as the policeman of the majority over us when they desperately wanted to throw us out. Your actions show a difference in the revolutionary fiber of individuals. You lied to our Bay Area comrades. There must be some reflection on your part on what stood between us then now that the question of unity is raised. You have been wrong on every major question since then and don't show any reflection. It was a bad split and the proof is that we are still faced with it. I told you then that perhaps someday a split would be justified but it wasn't clear then, and it still isn't as long as we proceed along parallel political lines. What were the differences then? You wanted personal and political capitulation; you demanded we go before the party as liars. We were begging for democratic centralism. You took our money to send Philips to England while telling us it was for "consultation on the trade union question"; now you admit it was to work out the details of our split. Cannon never did the things you have done! We want unification because for us politics comes first. You must realize that you can't build a movement the way you acted. You casually say now "we had no intention of carrying out your line." Your actions drove a lot of people out of the minority, old party cadres, good people with maybe one more fight left in them. We blame you for blocing with Dobbs in order to get us. These are not "subjective questions". This what looms largest: Will you do it again?

Nelson: It would have saved a great deal of trouble if what you advance now as the real reason for your split with us in 1962 had been the reasons given your own supporters and to the SWP then. However, the comments you made then can still be read in documents. The comrades on the West Coast knew Philips was lying through his teeth when he gave his "reasons" -- that is why they voted him dawn 17-0. It was phony demogogery, designed to stampede political opinion. Because of this good comrades were lost. You drove out the people whom originally you had bragged of attracting? And there was no political basis for it. The people that left had a good history in the movement, but you wasted them, and people continue to be wasted. The existence of two separate groups with such similar lines has made us a laughing stock among serious people. Two groups cannot continue to exist in the same areas fighting for the same people. We will either unite or one will be removed from the scene. If you call this "military", go back to Lenin and look at the ruthless struggles he waged. This is the criminal side of dishonest and unpolitical approach. You want to fraternize with our rank and file? They have read the documents, and they feel that politics determine over organization.

Wohlforth: As I was impressed at the last meeting and more impressed this week, and as we suspected from the beginning you are opposed to unification. In fact, Robertson clearly states now that we have a real difference and unless it is resolved there can be no unification. We have not in the slightest changed our position on the origin of our split. If you feel this is the one difference, there will be no unity. This is not a parallel with 1902. The split was principled and later proven so. As far as the origin of the split, I tried to explain as clearly as I could and don't expect you to accept this, As we look back on our past there were questions on which we admitted errors, but we have no apologies on the split. It was correct, clear and proper. If you wanted to function as a tendency with us you could have signed our statement. Robertson gets all excitedaztt. I smile because I view it so differently,-l can't take it seriously. He views it differently because he has a different method. He ought to understand that we. YLWbat we sal.! This was not an incident of which we are ashamed. We felt the split was a good and necessary thing, and the French and British felt the same way. We had no intention of submitting to your discipline. We were not interested in that type of functioning and felt the work involved was too important. We are not going to get any further clarification than this. It was a very good and healthy split. The comrades in this room do not express seriousness. They thrust in questions in which they know we will get disagreement. The main difference is that Robertson feels we are a bunch of bastards. Instead of progress we are getting retrogression, and it is not the fault of ACFI. You have brought up questions to show we are rotten finks rather than seeking to find areas of agreement and proceeding from there. You tell us we are lucky to be dealing with you instead of with your snarling ranks. You should encourage them to read the Bulletin instead of factional stuff from the past. You are preparing your membership not for unification but for a deeper split, and as the responsible leadership you are responsible if that is the end result. Obviously the Spartacist group is hostile to unity because they take every matter and turn it into snarling dispute that would disrupt the final step -- concrete common work. More common work or no unity. We are going to work in common first or there is not going to be any unity. If you think we are going to waste our time in hostile confrontations, we are not, because we have more important things to do. I urge that we proceed first to make clear the principled basis. We should take up the important theoretical and methodological differences and only then proceed to past differences. We must proceed to fruitful common work. It is absolutely important to prepare unification but you. are preparing your comrades for a split. You should bombard us with fraternization.

Mazelis: The last session and especially tonight have in large measure reflected retrogression. Wohlforth's remarks were another last ditch effort to try to salvage whatever progress we have made, and go on to the final stage. You talk of immediate unity and then prematurely raise issues the way you do. We are more honest about unity, want to proceed in such a way that when the bitterness comes out it will be in a good context. That is why we propose to start working together. You simply call us finks again, and don't even begin to understand what our motivation was, you don't try to put yourselves in our place. We have tried not to take you up on this. I can't stress too strongly that this will get us no place. You are sabotaging unity. We plead for an end to this approach. You must have no political mind at all if you expect to raise questions in the way you have.

Nelson: You should be honest and not resort to debators language for the minutes. If you will examine the history of the attempt to unite our two groups, it is one year since we made the first proposal for unity, right after you were expelled. Retrogression? Do not complain of a process which you have set in motion. Any outsider can tell from seeing our positions which there is a basis for unity between us. We emerged from the SWP with greater differences than there are now, but there was still a basis then for unity. These differences could exist within a single organization with democratic centralism. This would be parallel with our relationship to the IC, i.e., we might have to carry out a line at variance with our own opinion, but as long as we had the right to participate in the arrival at the line we would do this. The issues you have reacted to our raising are live issues. The issue of 1962 is extremely pertinent. What would be our position in relation to the IC given this defense of your 1962 role? The IC nailed the French Pabloites to the wall for expelling the majority of the French section. Would you repeat the same action today were we in a common organization? The differences within our tendency then were far less than those separating us from the Pabloites, and we continue to maintain the split in 1962 was unprincipled. These issues must be discussed. It is clear that there has never been a political basis for the separation of our two groups. It is from this separation that factionalism comes.

Robertson: At the time of our split you said it was absolutely unprincipled to have any contact between our two groups. Now you say you have not changed your position on the split. Common work is not our problem. Michael has been drawn into common work... on our initiative. You were able to give an exact rundown on what the differences were between our groups but still you are not willing to admit that unity is possible. What are we preparing our ranks for? We frankly don't know what the outcome with you will be. We have told them everything we say here. On 1962, we are not proposing that you grovel. We are not asking you to sign a statement that you did wrong. But you will have to hear these words. We do not see any political good will on your part (by this I don't mean "friendliness", the fake seduction tactics you used on the SWP and PL). If the split in 1962 was such a good thing, why then are you in this room now? All you can come up with is the Pabloist theory of Spartacist getting better despite our own intentions.

Wohlforth: We feel the split was principled, justified, and necessary in 1962, but that the Spartacist group has evolved and that being in a different position outside the SWP and facing different problems, that unification today is .possible. So far in our discussions we see no barrier to unification. The most important differences have in fact been discussed already -- differences in method. We are willing to go back to ACFI and the IC and propose to them that we make a statement that unity is both principled and desirable despite differences in method. But I will also have to state that there is a grave danger that these methodological problems are so severe that they are forcing the Spartacist group into anattitude of hostility toward us and preventing the natural process of unity, and that while there seems to be a principled basis for unity, until we have worked together we cannot tell whether it would work out. If Spartacist is sincerely interested in unity they will go back to their organization and propose that in the negotiation sessions a serious effort be made toward seeking agreement on political questions and common collaboration. Common work wll help break the present stalemate and lead to fruitful discussion. Finally we must try to handle the question of past differences in this same spirit and seek to make the best of the current process. By common work and collaboration we should hold discussion on areas where both groups can become involved in and function as a common group and a common tendency, e.g., the comrades in SDS should seek to function as a common fraction.

Nelson: You arc now ready to go to ACFI and the IC and say that the political basis for unity exists. We came into these sessions with this position, and we said if you would agree to abide by the decisions of a joint conference that you could have full privileges. Without your agreement we would have a literary exchange but no organizational fusion.

Robertson: My own first reaction to your proposed agreement is a favorable one. We have already willingly drifted into common work, e.g., our involvement of You have one of your people in the Garment Center Anti-Viet Nam war committee. made a valuable statement, that unity between our groups is principled and desirable. In turn you state you want common work. You insist that we clarify issues that suggest agreement rather than discuss past differences. But fruitful discussions are not simply "positive" ones, not simply putting a good face on things. I would like to postpone decision until we have a chance to review the minutes of this and earlier sessions. It is a big step.

Wohlforth: I agree "fruitful" and "positive" are not necessarily the same. This agreement should be complemented with a clear statement that past differences are not on the agenda. We can discuss them later. Nothing is gained by discussing them week in and week out. Unity is not tied to resolution of past differences. One of the points of unification would be tabling any discussion of past differences for a year. They must be put aside. This is one of the proposals we would make. We are not going to unite with you in order to fight over who did what in 1962.

Robertson: Tell us one thing... where is the reevaluation that has led you to believe that unity is now permissible? You stated several times tonight that it was a great split in 1962. When did the change take place? The only explanation you have given is comrade Pablo's explanation. We have to discuss at one or another point our differences. There is a contradiction in comrade Wohlforth's remarks, that you did right in 1962 and now are interested in unity and preparing your ranks for it. How can you justify the split in 1962 while saying that we oppose unity? In the future should you change your conclusion on PL, for example, will we then face a new split? It is this quality which gives us the gravest apprehension. How can you square your affirmation of your past record with unity now? This contradiction which we see in you does not bode well. It seems to me from tonight's discussion that a split would be on the order of the day next time we have differences, and we will have differences. That is why we introduced a discussion of democratic centralism, so that we will have a way of dealing with those differences when they arise within a common organization, especially differences of a magnitude comparable with those in 1962, i.e., differences that weren't all that much.

Wohlforth: It is clear we haven't changed our minds. It is not clear whether you feel unification is possible. You must make up your mind whether you think unity is possible, or impossible on the basis of our position on 1962. We don't expect you to understand our motivation on this question, and must make it clear to you that we will not have an interminable number of discussions on past differences. That would be your way of stating that unless we capitulate you will not unify with us. If this is so, it will be an admission that you really feel the past break was principled. Wo have come to conclusion that the bar to unity is not principled political differences, but whether or not you really want unity. Spartacist must stick spoons in their mouth and hold back the outpouring of previous differences. We need experiences in common work.

Nelson: On the question of postponement of discussion of past differences, I don't know. Subordination and regulation, certainly, if subordinated to the whole of which they are a part. If your proposal is based on a genuine desire to go forward, then the movement forward would find translation into concrete organizational steps toward the unification process. Otherwise it is no more than your continually restating “we're here because we're here". That is the reason those discussions have grated so much. We have to go forward into positive organizational steps.

Robertson: We will take your proposals to our REB and consult. Obviously the rest of the agenda is tabled pending clarification of this.

Next meeting: Thursday, August 5.

Meeting adjourned at 12:30 a.m.

Conversations with Wohlforth - 4

Marxist Bulletin No. 3 (Part IV - 1965)

SPARTACIST-ACFI UNITY NEGOTIATIONS

Fourth Session 23 July, 1965

Present: Spartacist: Robertson, Stoute, Nelson (alt.) (Harper, secretary)
ACFI: Wohlforth, Mazelis, Michael (alt.)

Meeting convened at 8:15 p.m. Chairman: Michael

Agenda:

1. Election Statement
2. IC World Resolution
3. Future Discussions

1. Election Statement:

(a) The corrected revision of the second draft was agreed upon; will be published in Spartacist and Bulletin.
(b) On the popular leaflet, ACFI will bring draft in to next meeting.

2. IC Statement:

Wohlforth: The 1961 IC document, "World Prospect for Socialism", was essentially an analysis of the international situation, capitalist development in the post-war period, the Stalinist countries, and the colonial revolution. "Rebuilding the Fourth International" is an evaluation of the International, making an important and definitive assessment of Pabloism, and, flowing from that, the need to rebuild the FI through the International Committee. The concluding section is the most important. The Fourth International founded by Leon Trotsky no longer exists. The task is to rebuild it, not to set up a new international. Marks a turning point in the assessment of reality that is becoming increasingly clear, the diverging course of the two international groupings since the last document, and the struggle to rebuild the International, regrouping forces around the IC, and the theory and practice of building national sections.

Nelson: With a few minor exceptions the document looks very good to us, and we find no major points of difference. We are pleased to note it develops several themes we had taken up in our 1963 international resolution, "Toward the Rebirth of the Fourth International." The development of the IC document on the basis of the intersecting crises of Stalinism and capitalism in the post-war period is good. In our own document we went into this, and used it as a basis to examine the crises that had beset the Trotskyist movement. If ACFI can agree with this IC document, it marks significant progress in our unity negotiations, since the document incorporates the perspective that Spartacist held in our earlier documents on the necessity in each country to build strong national parties as opposed to a section in your 1963 international resolution, The Rebuilding of the Fourth International:

"...our task now is not the conquest of state power but the conquest of the masses in preparation for the conquest of state power. Everywhere and in all countries our cadres must break away from the routine habits of propaganda group existence and reach out, no matter how meagre our forces may be, to establish contact with the masses themselves on whatever political level this can be done. This must be the main orientation of the whole international movement and the major task of each national section. Those sections which do not attempt such work will quickly find themselves bypassed by developments during the period of revolutionary upsurge."

At that time we in our international resolution, "Toward Rebirth of the Fourth International," section 18, said:

"The task of the international revolutionary Marxist movement today is to reestablish its own real existence. To speak of the 'conquest of the masses' as a general guideline internationally is a qualitative overstatement. The tasks before most Trotskyist sections and groups today flow from the need for political clarification in the struggle against revisionism, in the context of a level of work of a generally propagandistic and preparatory nature. An indispensable part of our preparation is the development and strengthening of roots within the broader working-class movement without which the Trotskyists would be condemned to sterile isolation or to political degeneration in the periods of rising class struggle and in either case unable to go forward' in our historic task of leading the working class to power. Above all, what can and must be done is the building of a world party firmly based on strong national sections, the assembling of a cadre of working-class militants won and tested in the process of the class struggle and on the firm basis of the revolutionary perspective of the Fourth International, the program to realize workers' democracy – culminating in workers' power."

Insomuch as the new IC document represents a change in your own perspectives in terms of what you saw two years ago, I think it is a good thing, one more obstacle removed on the road to unity. The document coincides more with our own analysis of the degeneration of the world movement and in particular the American movement, where it puts in its proper perspective the objective conditions which were a large contributing factor in the degeneration of the SWP. The main error of the existing parties after Trotsky's death is that they tried to preserve Trotskyism as they knew it rather than go ahead. You had placed much more stress on the subjective factor. The IC document does a good job of pin-pointing the weakness in Pabloism, the abandonment of the transitional program and their dropping any reference to dialectical materialism as a method. While you are often abstract, they are nicely concrete. The most serious omission in the document is that there is no section that developed the application of the Permanent Revolution to the colonial revolution. Implied but not explicit. Our '63 document "Toward Rebirth...", has a section that nicely develops what is missing (Paragraph 12):

“The theory of the Permanent Revolution, which is basic to our movement, declares that in the modern world the bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be completed except through the victory and extension of the proletarian revolution -- the consummation of workers' democracy. The experience of all the colonial countries has vindicated this theory and laid bare the manifest inner contradictions which continually unsettle the present state of the colonial revolution against imperialism. Precisely in those states where the bourgeois aims of national independence and land reform have been most fully achieved, the democratic political rights of the workers and peasants have not been realized, whatever the social gains. This is particularly true of those countries where the colonial revolution led to the establishment of deformed workers states: China, North Vietnam... and Cuba. The balance, to date, has been a thwarted success, either essentially empty, as in the neo-colonies of the African model, or profoundly deformed and limited, as in the Chinese example. This present outcome is a consequence of the predominance of specific class forces within the colonial upheavals, and of the class-related forms employed in the struggles. These forms imposed upon the struggle have been, for all their variety, exclusively 'from above,' i.e., parliamentary ranging through the bureaucratic-military. And the class forces involved have been, of course, bourgeois or petit-bourgeois. A class counterposition is developed out of the complex of antagonisms resulting from failure to fulfill the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The petit-bourgeois leaderships with their bureaucratic forms and empiricist methods are ranged against participation by the workers as a class in the struggle. The involvement of the working class is necessarily centered on winning workers' democracy and requires the leadership of the revolutionary proletarian vanguard with its programmatic consciousness of historic mission. As the working class gains ascendancy in the struggle and takes in tow the more oppressed strata of the petit-bourgeoisie, the Permanent Revolution will be driven forward."

We would l to submit this section as an amendment to the IC resolution. To repeat my original statement, the IC document is one we support, a good document.

Mazelis: It's very hard to know what to make of most of the things Nelson had to offer. One of the clearest points he made was at the end, that is, that it would appear that he would seek to amend or add to the resolution where it doesn't state your view, or enough of a developed view of the colonial revolution. I agree that the resolution as it stands, being more of a summing up of developments in the world movement, and not an international resolution, has these omissions. It is important that this be dealt with, be discussed, but does not have to be specifically in terms of this document. Of the other points you raised – really, I don't know what to think. There is an element of absurdity. I cannot agree with the way you approach the whole discussion, a bookkeeping kind of approach, a cross-referencing of documents – I think it's absurd, patronizing and petty, and politically it's fantastic. There are no grounds for the kind of conclusions you draw. I don't think the discussion tonight should be primarily on these kinds of questions. If you don't agree with the formulations of our '63 resolution, it is you who were in contradiction to the IC. You are twisting things around to show that in '63 you were right and we were wrong and that now the IC agrees with you. In '63 we had noted that today is a period of the conquest of the masses. I don't disagree with what you read from your '63 resolution, except for the beginning of it. The example of the British movement should prove that reaching out to the masses is exactly what is necessary. On the degeneration of the SAP – you are more absurd, you simply don't make sense. There is no disagreement between us and the British and the French on the SWP. As far as our assessment of Cannonism, there is no disagreement. Summing up, to put it mildly it struck me funny, it is silly, the stress that you put on (1) discussion of the IC document simply in terms of past differences; (2) in discussing these differences, twisting things to try to show that you have won the IC over to your views.

Robertson: To say that this document is in agreement with our former positions and in disagreement with yours is not absurd. As far as I know, the British wrote this without any thought in their heads about the past documents of either of our groups. While we are quite in agreement with the IC document, we feel it less than "World Prospect for Socialism", and in its own terms. I found lack of guidelines here for the actual building of sections of the FI. The document ended at its half-way point. I agree with Wohlforth that the old FI has been killed. Some generalization on the role of Pabloism in the colonial world is essential because the Pabloites have made the "Third World" the center of their perspective. Two other criticisms: ambiguity near the end of section on Algeria. The final paragraph on Cuba begs the critical question. Algeria and Cuba were treated in different language, unlike the IC statement in the Newsletter which spoke of Algeria and Cuba in bracketed language. This document draws the line of the IC on Cuba between our two positions. They say Cuba is not a healthy workers' state. But what is it? They should come forward and say. On Stalinism, it is a careless formulation to use the word "exploitation", suggests a New Class theory and capitalist extraction.

Wohlforth: When Robertson says it is a question of whether or not the IC document agrees with the positions of Spartacist as against those of ACFI, the IC document clearly states essentially what we were trying to say in '63 on the question of the role of the working class where it talks about on p. 12:

"The intervention in the class struggle is not separate from the theoretical discussion upon which we have insisted. There is no development of Marxist theory except insofar as revolutionary parties fight in practice to penetrate living reality with that theory, enriching it in the course of the struggle, to negate the revisionism which has destroyed the International originally founded by Trotsky. It is not enough to make formal theoretical corrections on the one hand and to carry out intensive activity in the class struggle on the other. Such a procedure might give the appearance of limited success, but only when Marxists see themselves and their consciousness as part of the living class struggle, developing with it and transforming its quantitative ebbs and flows into an enriched theory from which to develop the programme of the International, is the unity of theory and practice actually recognized. Only in this way will the cadres of the sections of the International be trained. Their internationalism will be worthy of the struggles of the international working class, because it develops as a living part, the conscious and most vital component, of these struggles."

What they are saying here is what we said in '63, regardless of the size of your movement you don't have a two or three stage development: our tasks today are propagandistic, tomorrow the mass movement, etc. Rather, the process of solidification takes place along with the process of intervention in the mass movement. Why is this old dispute being raised, since in concrete work the Spartacist comrades are simply carrying out this perspective? That is, despite your small size, you are seeking to become involved in the mass movement. Essentially Spartacist today agrees with what we said in '63 – a bookkeeping judgment would be that Spartacist has been won over to our position. The net effect from all this is to learn once again it is not very worthwhile to go over old documents. No difference exists between us on this today either because you have been won to our position or we didn't disagree then, that there was a difference in formulation and emphasis. Doesn't help us to go over the old dispute. A movement cannot be built isolated from the masses. Objective conditions change the way you intervene but not the essential objective: conquest of the masses. The comrades of the Spartacist group would be making a mistake if they felt the IC or the SLL does not mean what they say on p.9, 2nd paragraph: (about the empiricism of Cannon and of the American movement). The ideas in our history project came from the British and were inspired by a trip to England in Feb.'64 and there is fundamental agreement between ourselves and them on it. They are in fundamental agreement with our history project. Omission of the Permanent Revolution? There was a really clear difference between the '63 international resolutions of our two groups, and this was on the revolutionary perspectives of the petty-bourgeoisie, leading to Spartacist's position on the Cuban revolution. The IC document in no sense has the assessment you do of the role of the petty-bourgeoisie in the colonial revolution. We have this in common with the British. They do not have your position on Cuba, so the amendment you suggest is one with another theoretical line. It would be better to submit your material on the general theory leading to your position that the petty-bourgeoisie is capable of creating deformed workers states than to introduce it through this amendment. 'Exploitation" is used in the sense that the deformed workers states reflect capitalist exploitation to an extent; they are ambiguous transitional formations with capitalist norms of distribution.

Nelson: To reply to Wohlforth on why we raise old disputes, the purpose of these sessions is to examine and discuss the theoretical and political differences that may or may not exist between us. Part of this discussion is the matter of our agreement with the international resolution and our relationship with the IC. I disagree that we should approach the document 'separately and objectively' as you suggest. We must examine our common histories on points that are developed in the IC document. There were some differences between us that involved differences of appraisal. You said we differed on the role of the petty-bourgeoisie. However, both our documents made explicit that the petty bourgeoisie was, as a social stratum, incapable of successfully carrying through a workers revolution. In every case, they have fallen short. You have not yet come to a dialectical understanding of the nature of Stalinism as a political system, but have continued to maintain the model that existed in the 30's and the theoretical conclusions stemming from that model. The USSR played a counter-revolutionary role. A whole series of events had not yet taken place which relate to an analysis of the kind of states issuing from revolutions with petty-bourgeois leaderships. We are examining your positions, and you are supposedly determining what our positions are (but you had no difficulty in determining our positions at the time of the last convention). We saw our role as propagandistic and you saw yours as conquest of the masses. We had different positions, and we had separate documents--that is how serious our differences were. This can't be glossed over. Differences must be examined to determine past mistakes and get them out of the way. We have discussed other old differences and come to some conclusions which allowed us to go forward toward unity. The IC document's treatment of Cuba is not that ambiguous. On p.8, paragraph 1, the document says "The building of an independent workers' party and the establishment of workers' councils in Cuba as part of a proletarian internationalist orientation, with the extension of the revolution to Latin America and a revolutionary alliance with the workers of the USA and the rest of the world..." It seems to me that this assumes a social revolution has taken place with a bureaucratic leadership.

Mazelis: I agree with Wohlforth that the term "exploitation" should be looked at differently than, for example, a reference to "Soviet imperialism" would – I don't think there is any different evaluation on or softness toward state capitalism. Robertson is right when he says the document we are discussing wasn't written with an eye to the past documents of either of our groups. However, these points are all that our discussion should be. Nelson's contribution was made within a scholastic and subjective framework. Old differences can and should be discussed within a proper context, and I don't feel he has done this. He has stressed these old differences, and in an extremely scholastic way. On PL we admitted our mistakes. We aren't afraid to admit mistakes. We must discuss differences as they evolve, bring them to the present, if the differences are real and if they find expression in our work. We have to see if the overriding method is the same--not say "this document says what we said then... we were right and you were wrong." The process we want with Spartacist that we think is being achieved at some level is to bring differences up to date, not see them simply in the past. On the '63 documents, I tend to think there was a real difference there, not just in formulation. We feel Spartacist has made a lot of healthy steps forward since then toward the mass movement. I don't think there are no mistakes being made now by Spartacist. This kind of assessment of past differences is how we should appraoch things, and not as Nelson has.

Robertson: Especially in light of tonight's discussion, my most serious criticism must be taken up. I feel compelled to call upon the ACFI to recognize that unity between us is possible and desirable, otherwise we will lose momentum toward unity, especially if things continue like your sharp attack on us in your summary at the Algeria meeting, calling us "Shachtmanites," etc. We don't make our criticisms of you in this manner. We find more agreement with this document than we do with you, despite the fact that one of the conditions of your existence is that you not have any differences with the British. Two years ago when you had a bloc with Philips your American document had a semi-syndicalist approach. We are a propagandistic group, and our mass work is related to and subordinate to this. We recognize the need to do mass work'and that is why we kept trying to to get into CORE, etc., while we were still in the SWP. You should stick more closely to the British--then you will share their strengths as well as their weaknesses, like the SWP when it leaned on Trotsky. For our part, we continue to find even fuller political grounds for unity, and in addition we find greater organizational need for us to unify. We need to fuse with you even though you are only 1/5 to 1/10 of our size.

Wohlforth: Or 1/3.

Robertson: We are continuing to grow. Since our last meeting with you we have picked up organizing committees in the deep south and in Connecticut. We have picked up a black cadre in Chicago – not just one or two Negro comrades but a black cadre from the anti Willis movement – and elsewhere a new supporter in the SWP. We need your abilities. You think you are 1/3 our size? Frankly, we have been doing our best to check your claimed membership, and we find your claims mostly bluff. To ascertain the relationship of forces at the time of unity we will propose to get signed statements of membership from each comrade and then we will see where we stand. What do you mean by membership anyway? You speak of an Iskra program. Do you have democratic centralism? In terms of standing disagreements with you and/or the IC we see a recession of them. We would like to see some movement forward in these discussions. We can go on endlessly – finding documents to discuss – there are lots of things we could talk about. But the main point isn't just this but to find out if unity is possible and desirable. If we don't make progress in this direction there will be more incidents like the Algeria discussion, and momentum toward unity will die.

Wohlforth: I have been concerned about the animosities between our two groups. We feel extremely upset by the movement of the Spartacist comrades to take political differences we have not had time to discuss and bring than to the. public and insist that the discussion center around our differences on Cuba at a time when we had made no agreement on public political debate. This will set back progress toward unification. We have been denied our request for rank and file discussion, and the things we want to discuss have been pushed before the public. The tone of my summary was perhaps a subjective response to your action. I propose that we make a decision to regulate discussion between our two groups – to postpone public debate till we have privately discussed disagreements among ourselves. I find it hard to declare that there is a political basis for unity when (1) a tremendous amount of differences exist and (2) your action which was not an action of good will. I have a strong feeling that we are very close to achieving at least one notable objective, no matter how things evolve in the future, of removing artificial differences. What were our differences on the American question in 1963 - I would like to see this clarified. We had assumed that on this question our differences had been removed. In '63 there were formulations on both sides that both sides would like to reformulate. We made too many concessions to some of Philips' formulations. But you tried to amend the majority document rather than ours, though you are not now claiming the SWP's position of '63, but what I wrote you should do. I propose we try to get this question cleared up. Are the two groups separated by a different assessment of the American movement and our tasks today? We say "No, we are not separated, because what is crucial is what we have become today" – this should be the context of discussion. Discussion on how many members each of us has is beside the point – absolutely beside the point. It would be like the British asking you how many members you have compared to them.

Robertson: That is exactly what we want. We want as many votes as we are entitled to on the basis of our membership.

Wohlforth: That is not what you should want, but to ascertain whether or not you belong to the International. Politics, not numbers, comes first. I am sure the IC is not going to query you, and are not interested. They will be concerned only with your potential to build a movement in this country, which is related to your theoretical development. In these discussions we have to show and ability to admit our mistakes. The learning process is different from going back and saying "we were right then". We were half Shachtmanites in 1961, and at least I think that you have developed since then. It is not whether you were right and we were wrong, but whether you have learned something.

Stoute: About mistakes, it is not that we are afraid to admit making mistakes -- we always assess our past positions -- but what we wrote then still looks good to us today, and we are still carrying out the same line. If you think we have made a mistake, point it out to us and we will evaluate it. You mentioned that we should make a decision about public political debate. On Algeria and Cuba, this is not a new question but a question we have both been discussing in the past years in our publications; not something new but already public. We don't raise question in a polemical manner like you did in your summary. In your summary you didn't attack our position but destroyed a position we never held. You found it necessary to call us "Shachtmanites". We don't use the same tone toward you as we would use towards a Shachtmanite or Stalinist. You seem to feel it necessary to make it very clear that there is not one little bit of difference between the British and you.

Nelson: "If you don't learn from history, you are doomed to repeat it." This is the basis for our raising "old" questions (they aren't old). Are there differences between our groups on the American question? I say no essential differences. Wohlforth is being demagogic in raising the straw man on relative size and what the attitude of the IC would be. Our discussions have the purpose of political clarification. Discussion should be in terms of where we have come from, how we have gotten here. You said there are formulations in our '63 documents we should both forget. No indeed! The truth is that on almost every major point and tactic in dispute between us over the last years, you have been in error -- mostly by your own admission: on the youth question, nature of the SWP (which resulted in our split), on PL, on your assessment of the level of struggle and tasks of the revolutionary party. In '63 you supported the party majority on Black Nationalism and submitted only an action amendment. On the American question your position was that now was the time for the conquest of the masses. We have to agree on what the mistakes were in order to come to a position now. We know our common history. We see a basis for a principled unity to be consummated now, no obstacles to unity now, and all our discussion is raised in this context. The question of numbers, this is important so that the minority in a party or national section will have proportional representation. On public debate -- first you did not notify us of your intention, could have been eliminated if we had had a joint forum. Maz. siad to come down and speak from the floor. Algeria and Cuba are tied up together. We were compelled to reply to your position on Cuba, especially as sections of the radical public know we are engaged in a unity discussions.

Mazelis: Not that we are opposed to discussion of these questions. Robertson's arguments were demolished by Wohlforth at the meeting, but we padi the rent and the purpose of the meeting was not to discuss our differences with you. Robertson should have gone into the questions at much less length. We were upsent because the whole character of the meeting was changed. This is in line with your military confrontation policy. On our histories over the past few years -- there is not reallly much agreement -- we are not speaking the same language. I wonder if you really understand and mean what you say when you say "Over the past 5 years you have been wrong on every major question". Our admission of error over PL is in no way an admission that you were right. We have shown we know how to make an assessment of PL. Since then, it is you that have been dead wrong and not us. We don't agree with you. We think you were dead wrong. We are proud of our '63 document, and are sorry you don't support it. When we admit some errors and see a forward development on our part, Robertson says "empirical zig-zags". We feel we have gained. We gained from our bloc with Philips. We are not ashamed. We feel you have not developed in the same way. We are interested in discussion with you, in unity with you, in working together, precisely because you have developed, whether you realize it or not. You have developed against your own will.

Robertson: We did not artificially raise the issue of Cuba. You can't discuss Algeria theoretically without bringing in Cuba, Egypt, etc. You invited our people to come down and we saw this as opening up discussion with our members. If there is going to be an opening up of discussion, it will not be a one-sided discussion. Yes, you demolished "our" position on the "petty-bourgeois state" -- a position we don't hold. It won't work, it's not smart to use these tactics, it's really not. On the '63 American question documents, we submitted an excellent amendment to the majority document. With our amendment it gave thrust to the SWP position, to set down roots in mass struggle. The declared position of the SWP was not their actual one. Our amendment looks good today. Your document turned the SWP document inside out. We have been following out our position, and in our sections have a balance between propaganda and activity. Hindsight is a tool we have, a powerful test of method. We don't think you have "Marxist method". We see a difference between your protestations and your actions. You do what you want, and tack on justifications. Of course politics comes first, but number is important which is why Wohlforth snapped "1/3" when we said "1/5 to 1/10." We said there never was a basis for a split. Healy's calculations were predicated on our demolition. The only reason you must deal with us today is because of our numbers. We have always been prepared to be dealt with on the basis of democratic centralism. Unity is a necessity given the extent of our agreement. We gather from reports from Europe that there has been a mistaken reversal of the relationship of forces between us in this country. This will be and is being set straight. Our mistakes – they're really not very many. Speaking personally, I reacted insufficiently in the summer of '61 in letting you try to oppose the party over the youth (letter to Ed), in that I tried to control you rather than fight you. In "IDORP" I let the phrase "the SWP is our party" slip through ill-defined -- I was sloppy and had to pay for it. In the fall of '62 I failed to recognize early enough that you would bloc with the Majority to get us thrown out. These were serious errors. They might have led to our destruction. I would say in general, however, that we have done very well. Remarkably so, and the documents as we go over them look pretty good. It is not bragging to say that our purpose has been straight as an arrow. I repeat – is ACFI a democratic centralist organization?

Wohlforth: At the Algeria meeting, there is a difference between what we did and what the Spartacist comrades did. We did not address ourselves publicly to our theory. We were ambiguous on purpose theoretically on Cuba. The essential lessons of Algeria could be achieved largely within that framework. In our whole history we have never had a public polemic with Spartacist. However, you chose to have a public polemic. In our opinion your theory leads to bureaucratic collectivism. We don't feel we should say this in the Bulletin. On past differences, where we were supposed to have been wrong on everything and you were supposed to have been right on everything except for your errors in not being tough enough toward us, I think it is primarily a difference of method. I do not see how at one and the same time we have erred, followed a zig-sag empiricist course, have nothing approaching Marxist method, and then in the same breath you think a principled basis for unity exists. If we felt you didn't approach Marxist method, we would be forced to come to the conclusion that there isn't a basis for unity. We feel you have developed and have a different position than you used to whether you recognize it or not. You may have an incorrect method abstractly and in your Cuba approach, but this doesn't mean in your general work you don't have anything approaching a Marxist method – if you didn't your work would be different. Robertson says his purpose has been straight as an arrow. Marxism doesn't move like an arrow. We feel our assessment of the SWP was correct and because of that assessment we now have a relationship with the most viable section of the SWP. We have always refused to let the SWP alienate us from the rank and file of the SWP. The position we took at that time was correct. You haven't done what we did as regards PL – a serious tactical error, and a big one. On the American question, what we proposed the party should do flawed from our analysis of the American and world situations. The SWP did not share that analysis, did not have a method of proceeding from the conjunctural analysis to concrete tasks. Our position on the Negro question stemmed from that analysis. You made concrete amendments to a document which didn't have a correct analysis. I still wonder whether we share the same conjunctural analysis. You had Hansen's theory at the last meeting. Marcus seems to agree with our conjunctural analysis, being a theoretical person. On democratic centralist functioning, we are a democratic centralist organization. However, I have a very deep suspicion that we are not in agreement with you as to what democratic centralism is. Democratic centralism is an organizational question that flows from the theroetical tasks, the nature of the period, and the nature of our movement. We must have democratic centralism, but not always the same organization at all times. We have no temptation to set ourselves up as a party at this time.

Stoute: What does your deep suspicion on what we consider democratic-centralism flow from?

Wohlforth: From your "military formations" policy, Spartacist buttons, etc.

Nelson: On the question of our theoretical development, and the expression "our purpose has been straight as an arrow" as being un-Marxist: theory is verified and tested by history. We have an analysis, and positions based on our theory, they are on paper, and over 3-4 years we have had an opportunity to test them. Our theoretical development has been consistent – not slamming around from excess to excess, on the Cuban State, Black Nationalism, and the SWP. If you think in fact that you were correct, when did the party become something other than revolutionary? At the '63 Convention you felt it was was still revolutionary, yet you were ready to leave in the fall of '63. When was the process of the party's degeneration consolidated? There seems to be a rather curious quality about your statements concerning the future of our group – you seem to assume a separation between our groups for a long time to come. We are prepared to move this night to consummate unity. There has always been a programmatic basis for unity. The existence of two separate and identical forces is detrimental to the development in this country of a revolutionary movement. Politics demand that we unite. For you to maintain a separate course and to seek to maintain a separate course is to play a role detrimental in this country to the building of a force capable of building a revolutionary party.

Wohlforth: Our assessment of the development of the discussion over the last 2 weeks is that unification now would be a proposal to have an internalized war to the death, would not be a serious unification. I believe your assessment of our role would motivate you to do this, you will feel it necessary to conduct a struggle against us within a common organization. This will not be unification but destruction. This is why we are not proposing that we unify tonight and why we propose an entirely different course than we have been following thus far. What has been prepared over the last couple of weeks is a deepening' antagonism between the two groups. We need more common action. Only when we have comradely relations between the two groups can we have unity. You aren't really prepared to say we can have unity tonight; you may mean we can have unification in three months. We need more discussion here and internationally. What you mean by "unity" is really "let's internalize the fight". What we mean by unity is an end to the struggle.

Robertson: We will certainly have to discuss democratic centralism. We will bring in documents to the next meeting. This is appropriate since the majority of any new organization that would be formed will come from the Spartacist side. But unity presupposes a willingness to unite. It will take months and years of common struggle against common enemies in a common organization to erase the old line between us, these are the hard facts. Of course unity couldn't be completed tonight but would take several months, but you don't even yet agree that there is a political basis for it – this is the obstacle to progress. You won't agree that unity is politically feasible. This is what we want to talk about. We are ready to unify now. Why can we unite with you despite your zig-zags, etc.? –Because you have an umbilical cord to the SLL and they are stable. That will keep correcting you when you get off course, but the trouble is, you generally tend to overcorrect. Your present terrible mistake is refusing to unite with us. You seem to believe that if we don't unite we can have a beautiful coexistence. That is POLYVANGUARDISM. Such a theory is deleterious to the working class. As regards PL, you made a serious error last fall in sending in Danny and Fred as open members of ACFI. We were trying to develop indigenous pro-Spartacists but you went in openly and this brought about a hardening up against Trotskyists organizationally. At the time we didn't have suitable opportunity for our policy. As late as two weeks ago, Epton thought the Bulletin and Spartacist were publications of the same group. It is a serious and elementary mistake to think we want to start with politics and tactics rather than theory. We mean program. We aren't talking the same language. Cannon always talked program. You are wrongly separating Cannon and Trotsky on this matter.

Wohlforth: The antagonisms and political assessments which have been brought out tonight have political and theoretical roots impelling factionism, external or internal. They express political differences that need to be clarified, not removed entirely. If we simply make a statement there is no political bar to unity, there maybe unity but it will be a unified war. You comrades recognize this. If we agreed to unity you would write to your comrades saying "Wohlforth is prepared to unify, prepare for the internal war". No sane political person would make the assessment you have made of us tonight and still say a basis for unity exists. Because of all this we have to clarify things more. We haven't clarified our differences on the American question. You are saying that just discussing our differences is impeding unity. You aren't serious political people if you say this, it's a game.

Nelson: Wohlforth has turned the basis for our friction on its head. Frustration will continue to exist and there will be in fact a war to the death as long as our two groups are l existing organizationally and internationally in the same arenas. This is the source of friction. As a unified organization we will be able to control these things, not have an internal war to the death. In the 3rd and 4th Internationals, when there was more than one organization in the same country, one or the other had to be destroyed. Only one party will make the revolution in this country. Politics and program, not “abstract" questions, are decisive. There is no such thing as "method" abstracted from the actual building of a movement.

Stoute: If you don't think there is a basis for unity, why have you come to these meetings in the first place? The kind of differences you suggest might be a bar to unity were all within the framework of a common program. This sort of difference will come up even if we were not two separate organizations and should be expected within a national organization, even if no differences existed in the first place. The real reason you have not agreed to unite is something other than what we have been discussing.

Mazelis: To say we are appended to the British is a moronic kind of statement, and I can't believe Robertson believes that. It is completely cynical and insulting to us to say we maintain our existence by having no differences with the British. This amounts to calling us politically unprincipled, and I don't think we have to prove that this is wrong, that as a matter of fact we do have some honest but quite compatible differences with the British. The basic problem is not one of having obviously compatible differences, but Nelson says we have been dead wrong on most major political questions in the past years. What are our current errors then? Even if there were none now, if what Nelson says is true we would have differences in six months. Don't you think we should approach things in the way we want to approach them? We are trying to create the basis for unity, not prepared to say tonight there is a pre-existing basis for unity. We think we see development on your part, but we feel we have also developed.

4. Topic and Time of next meeting:

30 July, on democratic-centralism.

Robertson distributed a Spartacist leaflet attacking Workers World for endorsing Jesse Gray who is running in the Democratic primary. He also distributed Spartacist correspondence with Deacons and a cover letter.

Meeting adjourned about midnight.